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DUKE L4WJOUP4L [Vol. 1981:449 I. NEVADA V. HALL In Nevada v. Hall 9 three California residents were injured when their car collided in California with a car owned by the State of Nevada. The driver of the Nevada car was an employee of the University of Nevada, an official arm of the State of Nevada; he was concededly engaged in university business at the time of the accident. 10 The plaintiffs sued the driver's estate, the University, and the State of Nevada in the California courts." The state and the university were served with process pursuant to the California long-arm statute for out-of-state drivers.' 2 The trial court quashed service on the state defendants, but the Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded for trial, holding that the State of Nevada could be sued in California courts. 1 3 The court reasoned that when one state engages in activities in another state, it is not exercising sovereign power over the citizens of the second state and thus cannot assert sovereign immunity in the courts of the second state unless the second state confers that right. 14 9. 440 U.S. 410 (1979 14. 8 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 503 P.2d at 1364-65, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. For this conclusion the court relied on Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) , which held that Alabama could be sued in a federal court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 51-60 (1976), despite the eleventh amendment, for injuries sustained by an employee of Alabama's state-owned railway, 8 Cal. 3d at 524,503 P.2d at 1364, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The Parden Court had reasoned that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce after the enactment of the FELA, Alabama had waived its immunity. 377 U.S. at 192. The Parden Court had also, however, relied heavily on the federal regulatory power the states gave to Congress under the commerce clause in ratifying the Constitution. Id. at 190-92. Since Nevada had given no comparable power to California, the California court's reliance on Parden is subject to the criticism that the considerations of federal power present in Parden have no applicability in the Nevada v. Hall situation' Martiniak, supra note 13, at 1146-47. Moreover, the waiver aspect of the Parden case has been narrowed in later Supreme Court eleventh amendment cases. See Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-86 (1973) (upholding immunity and distinguishing Parden on grounds other than waiver); Id. at 299-308 (Brennan, J., dissenting on the basis of Parden); Field, The that comity required a grant of immunity to Nevada, the court held that other policies' 5 outweighed the policy of avoiding embarrassment to a sister state.
On remand the trial court found the Nevada driver negligent and awarded $1.15 million in damages.' 6 Nevada appealed, arguing that the damages should have been limited to the $25,000-per-claimant ceiling in the Nevada statute waiving Nevada's immunity in the Nevada courts.' 7 The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the California Supreme Court had permitted the suit against Nevada to go forward based not on the Nevada waiver statute but rather on the principle that "Nevada's sovereign protection does not extend beyond its own borders."' 8 The court of appeals also rejected arguments that the $25,000 limit should apply under the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution' 9 or under California conflict-of-laws rules. 20 After the California Supreme Court's denial of review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 ' and affirmed the judgment of the California Court of Appeals. 22 Justice Stevens's opinion, which five justices joined, 23 noted at the outset that any federal rule restricting California's exercise of jurisdiction "must be a part of the United States Constitution." 24 Before beginning its constitutional inquiry, the Court distinguished two types of sovereign immunity: immunity in the sovereign's own courts (domestic immunity), and immunity in the courts of another sovereign (inter- 15. These policies included the interest in providing a forum for a resident to seek redress, the interest in assuming jurisdiction when most of the evidence is within California's borders, the anomaly of precluding an action against Nevada when California would have been amenable to suit had it been involved, and the suspect nature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. DUKE L4WJOURMAL [Vol. 1981:449 sovereign-ie., interstate or international-immunity). 25 The Court, quoting Justice Holmes, found support for domestic immunity "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. ' 30 Because California law clearly did not accord immunity to Nevada, the Court turned to whether the federal Constitution required California to recognize interstate immunity. 31 Interstate immunity, according to the Court, unlike the immunity of states in the federal courts, was not considered when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. 32 Moreover, the significant controversies over state immunity, represented by the cases of Chisholm v. Georgia, 33 Hans v. Louisiana, 34 515 (1977) .
34. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans the Supreme Court held that even though the eleventh amendment did not expressly immunize states from suits by their own citizens, the amendment's overruling of Chisholm required construing the Constitution as leaving the states their sovereign immunity, even in a federal-question suit brought by a citizen against his own state in federal court. Id. at 10-19.
35. 292 U.S. 313 (1934) . In Monaco the Court held that a state may not be sued by a foreign the eleventh amendment, all concerned the scope of authority of the federal courts to hear suits against states. These cases thus explored the power that states gave to federal courts when ratifying the Constitution, not the power of states to subject other states to suit. 36 The Court also rejected Nevada's argument that the full faith and credit clause demanded that California apply Nevada's $25,000 damage limit. 37 Reaffirming settled law, the Court stated that when one state's law furthers a legitimate public policy, the full faith and credit clause does not compel that state to surrender the application of its law in favor of a second state's law that would control if the case were brought in the second state's court. 38 Because California had a legitimate interest in fully compensating those persons injured on its highways, the full faith and credit clause did not require California to apply the Nevada damage limit. 39 Finally, the Court considered the theory that the Constitution includes an unexpressed principle that states shall remain free from suit in the courts of other states. In forming a single nation, Nevada argued, the states tacitly agreed to honor one another's sovereignty.4 n Although recognizing that the states comprise a union of entities of limited sovereignty, the Court hesitated to go beyond the explicit constitutional limits on state power and impose a new implicit limit. 41 To do so "would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States-and the power of the people-in our Union." 42 The Court thus concluded that if one state grants immunity to another, it does so purely as a matter of comity.
43
In a footnote to its discussion of full faith and credit, the Court raised the possibility that its analysis might be limited to cases that pose "no substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism":44
Suits involving traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign nation despite the provision in article III for suits between a state and foreign states. In a separate dissent Justice Rehnquist asserted that interstate immunity was a necessary postulate "to make the Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each provision within that document the full effect intended by the Framers." 49 As evidence of this postulate Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the states ratifying the eleventh amendment, which closed the doors of the federal courts to most 'suits against states, must have assumed that they would enjoy immunity from suit in the courts of sister states. 50 Justice Rehnquist also noted that the same assumption appears in repeated dicta in Supreme Court cases; 5 1 moreover, it comports with the theory of Supreme Court cases that find states immune from suit in the federal courts. 52 Finally, in view of the majority's rejection of a constitutional foundation for interstate immunity, Justice Rehnquist disparaged the suggestion that "cooperative federalism" may place limits on state court jurisdiction over another state. 53 Should the Court attempt to fashion such limits, he argued, it would be operating without principled guidance. cial power. Justice Marshall has accepted, however, the theory that a state may consent to suit in federal court by voluntary waiver of its immunity. 60 The problem with Justice Marshall's analysis is that parties cannot by their consent confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. 61 Although an exception for state immunity may be historically justifiable, it is not logically justifiable.
Justice Brennan's analysis in Employees avoided the difficulty of Justice Marshall's theory. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Marshall that sovereign immunity is purely a state common-law doctrine, and that the states gave Congress the power to remove that immunity. But Justice Brennan approached the eleventh amendment question differently, arguing that the amendment should be read literally to preclude only actions against states by citizens of other states or foreign states. Moreover, Justice Brennan, unlike Justice Marshall, read the eleventh amendment as an absolute bar to federal-court jurisdiction. 62 Under Justice Brennan's theory, therefore, a state must answer to its own citizens in federal court if Congress so provides, but citizens of other states are relegated to state courts to press their federal claims. Justice Brennan's theory thus emphasizes the citizenship of the plaintiff in determining whether a state may assert sovereign immunity. This result is difficult to reconcile with Hans v. Louisiana, 63 which seems to reject such distinctions. 64 A third theory, supported by Monaco v. Mississippi, 65 finds the states in most cases to be immune in federal court because the immunity is "inherent in the constitutional plan. ' 66 Monaco v..Mississoppi held that states are immune from suits brought by foreign nations, distinguishing this immunity (as well as the states' immunity from both citizens' and noncitizens' suits) from the amenability of states to suit by other states or the federal government on the theory that in the former cases, unlike the latter, the plan of the Constitution did not involve the 66. This is the theory that Justice Rehnquist in his Hall dissent sought to extend from state immunity in federal court to interstate immunity. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
surrender of immunity. 67 This theory is consistent with Hans v. Louisiana in basing the states' retention of sovereign immunity on the Constitution as a whole rather than mooring it solely to the eleventh amendment. Moreover, the notion that sovereign immunity resides in the states unless the plan of the Constitution calls for its removal can be reconciled with cases upholding federal statutes that expose states to suits by individuals. 68 Such statutes do not expand federal-court jurisdiction contrary to article III; rather, the constitutional plan calls for congressional power to curtail an otherwise secure immunity.
Professor Martha Field has criticized the idea that the Constitution, found by the Chisholm Court to abolish state immunity in federal court, should be interpreted to require such immunity (absent congressional action). 69 Professor Field argues that a more logical position is that although article III, as clarified by the eleventh amendment, may not be interpreted to remove common-law state immunity, neither does that article require such immunity. 70 This theory also can explain the Court's approval of federal statutes that explicitly remove state immunity. Recent cases considering such statutes have involved the exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment, 71 but the theory that article III and the eleventh amendment have been amended by the fourteenth amendment, thus allowing suits against states under statutes enforcing the fourteenth amendment, is not as satisfactory as Professor Field's theory. 72 Also unsatisfactory is the older rationale that a state that participates in a federal program waives its constitutional immunity. 
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eral courts. 74 They have also argued, however, that the Constitution does provide immunity from judicially created causes of action---that is, actions created directly under the Constitution or implied from a statute. This distinction is based on the states' greater control over Congress than over the federal judiciary; the argument thus emphasizes the relevance of separation-of-powers considerations in determining state immunity from federal jurisdiction. 75 Despite the differences among these theories, they all share a concern with the Constitution's effect on state immunity in the federal courts, not on sovereign immunity in courts of sister sovereigns. The Nevada v. Hall majority was therefore correct not to consider these theories in its inquiry into interstate immunity. 76 Instead, the Court relied on a Supreme Court case on international sovereign immunity, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 77 to determine that the law of the forum state controls the extent to which a state can assert immunity in the courts of another state. Although the Court's analysis does not withstand scrutiny, the reference to The Schooner Exchange does suggest that international law should form the basis for interstate immunity. To examine the Court's analysis, however, it is first necessary to compare more fully the differing policy bases for domestic and international sovereign immunity.
78

B. Policy Bases of State Immunity.
The Nevada v. Hall Court accepted Justice Holmes's rationale for domestic sovereign immunity: "[Tihere can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. ' 79 This rationale has been challenged as a tautology, 0 and is at odds with a constitutional system in which the ultimate authority that makes the law is the people, not the legislature. 8 ' The Constitution, which reflects the people's will, curbs legislative action through judicial review; it is therefore illogical to preclude suit against the government for the rea- son given by Justice Holmes-that the government makes the lawbecause the government ultimately is subject to the law. On the other hand, if the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity is limited to actions for money damages-as for practical purposes it is, in the federal courts at least 82 --then the "law" involved is the law providing for the payment of money out of the public fisc. When talking solely about the allocation of public funds, it is not incompatible with the American constitutional scheme to say that the legislature is "the authority that makes the law." The Court has never required Congress to legislate for the payment of damages nor overturned refusals of Congress to authorize such payment. Of course it may be said that this restraint follows from the sovereign immunity doctrine itself; thus we return to the initial criticism of the Holmes rationale--that it is circular.
From the volume and vehemence of the criticism of domestic sovereign immunity, one might doubt that there is an articulable policy in its favor. 8 3 The ability of legislatures to waive sovereign immunity and place conditions on that waiver, and the inability of courts to do so, suggest, however, that the purpose of domestic sovereign immunity is to preserve the separation of powers. The argument in favor of such an immunity is as follows.
To protect constitutional rights the courts can require governments to modify their actions in spite of the legislature's desires, because the courts have a superior ability, through independence and training, to be objective and to determine the nature of constitutional rights. Deciding whether or not to compensate persons for past violations depends, however, not on the definition of a right but on how public funds, which cannot provide for every good and proper cause, should be spent. This kind of decision is best made legislatively because of the legislature's superior ability to allocate public funds, through its responsiveness to popular views and its ability to weigh interests. When statutory rights are involved, it follows a fortiori that compensation should be at the discretion of the legislature.
That the federal government and many states have waived sovereign immunity strengthens rather than weakens the argument. It shows that legislatures do compare the public benefit of compensating victims of government torts and contract breaches to the benefit of other uses of public funds. And even when states waive sovereign immunity, the doctrine permits the legislature to limit recoveries for sound policy reasons. One example is the discretionary function exception 4 to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 85 which keeps litigants from challenging the legality of government policy decisions through tort suits 86 rather than through the Administrative Procedure Act. 87 A second example is a dollar limit on the amount of recovery, like the limit in the Nevada statute considered in Nevada v. Hall, 88 which prevents the allocation of extraordinary amounts of public funds without independent legislative consideration. A third example is the preclusion of jury trials, 89 which seeks to avoid the excessive verdicts that may result from a jury's awareness of the government's deep pocket. In the federal courts, barring jury trials in civil actions against the United States is consistent with the seventh amendment 90 because the doctrine of sovereign immunity permits the government to require trial to the court as a condition of waiver. 91 The above argument grounds domestic sovereign immunity in the separation between legislative and judicial functions. The argument for state immunity in the federal courts adds to these separation-ofpowers concerns the problem of allocating power between the federal government and the states. One's assessment of the relative competence of the federal legislature, the federal courts, and the state legislatures to make compensation decisions depends largely on one's view of the degree to which states should be independent of the federal government. Intersovereign immunity has traditionally been based on different policy considerations. The question is no longer which part of a single government shall allocate public funds. Instead, the question is whether the judicial arm of one government should have authority to resolve disputes involving another equal government without that government's consent. The argument in favor of intersovereign immunity is as follows.
A state perceives its being brought before the courts of a legally equal state as an affront to its dignity. 92 Such perceived indignities may burden the friendly relations of the two states. A court order of one government to seize the property of another government in order to enforce a judgment presents even greater dangers of hostility. 93 To preserve friendly and peaceful relations between sovereigns, disputes should be resolved by negotiation or by reference to a higher authority.
In the international sphere an individual's claim against a foreign government may be presented diplomatically by his government. 94 This method both preserves peace and confines dealings with foreign states to the executive branch, which is more capable and flexible in international affairs than the judicial branch. 96. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Such a conclusion is unwarranted; indeed it suggests the absence of any binding international law.
Chief Justice Marshall, in his analysis of the French claim of immunity, first pointed out that "The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power." ' ° In other words, courts set up by a government derive their authority from the same source as does that government, and may not, either practically or theoretically, rule in contradiction of that source of authority. 10 ' In the United States this means, of course, that the courts must rule consistently with the Constitution and with valid laws passed under the authority of that Constitution, even if some other source of authority such as international law requires a different result. Thus the federal courts, as domestic courts, must prefer federal statutes to inconsistent previous treaty obligations, 1 0 2 or inconsistent customary international law. 10 107. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. 11 U.S. [Vol. 1981:449 There are several reasons why these two points were necessary to Marshall's decision that the French warship was protected by sovereign immunity. First, regardless of what international law required, if American law was to the contrary, then Marshall could not find immunity, because the Supreme Court is a court of the United States. Second, international law would not require immunity if the United States did not consent in some sense to that requirement. There is such consent, however, if international custom reflects a general practice accepted as law. In the next portion of The Schooner Exchange, not quoted by the Nevada v. Hall majority, the Court discussed this point: "This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory." ' ' Chief Justice Marshall then demonstrated that international custom required immunity in the circumstances, 1 2 and concluded that the immunity constituted "a principle of public law."" 3 Thus The Schooner Exchange found the United States bound as a nation on the international plane to respect the immunity of the vessel. This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common opinion, growing out of that usage.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world.
Id.
112. Court, as a domestic court, would do so, but such was not the case." 15 The Nevada v. Hall Court read The Schooner Exchange to support the proposition that if California and Nevada were independent and completely sovereign nations, then Nevada's assertion of immunity in California courts would depend solely on California law. 11 6 The Court thus analogized Nevada's claim of immunity in California courts to France's claim of immunity in United States courts. The analogy does not hold, however, because California and Nevada courts are unlike those of the United States in The Schooner Exchange in one important respect: California courts are not truly domestic courts of California in the same sense that the United States Supreme Court is a domestic court of the United States. This is because the decisions of California's high court are appealable to a court that can require California to conform to interstate rules: the United States Supreme Court.
If appeal lies from one court to the court of a higher authority, the first court must apply not only the law of the authority that gives the court power, but also the law of the higher authority. Since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee" 17 it has been clear that the United States Supreme Court can constitutionally reverse final state-court decisions affecting federal rights. The Constitution makes federal law supreme,"" but it is the mechanism of review that compels a state court to apply federal law rather than state law when the two conflict."1 9 Supreme Court review makes courts of the states also in a sense courts "of the United States." If decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were appealable to a world court, let us say, in the Hague, then the Supreme Court would be unable to apply United States law that was in conflict with international obligations. Just as the Constitution makes federal law superior to state law, international law is superior (in theory) to national law.' 20 If the Hague World Court could reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court would become a lower court of the international system. International law would then prevail over inconsistent United States law, and the principle of applying interna- tional law only to the extent that it is "part of' domestic law would collapse.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
This very phenomenon has occurred in Western Europe. The treaties establishing the European Economic Community' 2 ' create extensive international rights and duties among the members. 122 Under traditional analysis a court of one of the member states could not enforce such obligations in contravention of a constitutional law of that state. But there are treaty provisions creating a higher court, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which effectively reviews decisions of national courts on the interpretation of European Community law. 123 In the face of several challenges, the European Court has consistently required domestic courts to apply Community law despite the internal law of the member states, even if that internal law is of constitutional dimensions. 24 On Community law issues, then, the domestic courts have in a real sense become courts "of the Community" rather than courts of, for instance, Italy or the Netherlands.
But the Supreme Court is not subordinate to any international tribunal, and was not subordinate in 1811 when The Schooner Exchange was decided. Chief Justice Marshall was correct, therefore, in first finding sovereign immunity to be a part of the law of the United States before applying it in a court of the United States. Marshall's analysis does not imply, however, what the majority in Nevada v. Hall inferred: that sovereign immunity would not be binding internationally even if United States law were to the contrary. Under Marshall's analysis if United -States law conflicted with an international rule, the Supreme Court, as a court of the United States not subject to review, would apply domestic law in violation of international law. A state court, in contrast, is subject to review by a higher authority; the Supreme Court in fact exercised that authority in the Nevada v. Hall case itself. Thus a state court, unlike a domestic court not subject to review, must bring its law into conformity with a relevant higher law. The Schooner Ex-121. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 189, mandates that Community "regulations," a form of legislation enacted by Community institutions, are "directly applicable" law. 
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less the Supreme Court has applied international law in such cases. The Court has also applied international law to disputes between states over water rights 130 and water pollution.131
The constitutional basis for the application of international law is the provision for federal jurisdiction over disputes between states and for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over disputes to which a state is a party. 1 32 The theory is not only that the Supreme Court must apply some rule to resolve disputes between states, but also that the Constitution contemplates the Supreme Court as a substitute for diplomacy and war-methods that sovereign states use to enforce their rights under international law but that the states surrendered when they ratified the Constitution. 33 The same analysis applies to any suit in which a state is a party. Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States not only to controversies between two or more states, but also to controversies between a state and citizens of another state. 134 Moreover, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to both types of cases. 135 Justice Holmes's analysis in Missouri v. Illinois 3 6 supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court may apply international law in a suit between a state and the citizens of another state, as well as in a suit between states. In denying the right of Missouri to enjoin Chicago's discharge of sewage into a river flowing into Missouri, the Supreme Court distinguished between a nuisance warranting an equity suit by one citizen against another, which would not trigger Supreme Court jurisdiction, and a nuisance that "might be created by a State upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a casus belli for a State lower down [the river] unless removed,"' 37 which would warrant an original Supreme Court suit. 38 In arriving at this distinction, the Court reasoned: Just as the grant of judicial power is used as authority to apply international law to disputes between states in Missouri v. Illinois, the grant of judicial power over disputes between a state and citizens of another state, which Justice Holmes also mentioned, should be deemed as well to authorize the application of international law in an appropriate case.
There are two possible problems with the application by the Supreme Court of international law rights and duties in cases between a citizen and a state, as opposed to cases between states. First, there may be eleventh amendment immunity in the former case, but not in the latter. Second, the statute providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction for state cases arguably does not permit the application of international law as a basis for reversing a state court judgment.
Under article III of the Constitution as modified by the eleventh amendment, states are immune from suit by individuals in federal court, but not immune from suit by other states.1 4° One might argue that the Supreme Court, being subject to article III and the eleventh amendment, lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit by an individual against a state, even on appeal from a state court: if a federal district court is constitutionally precluded from hearing such a suit, the Supreme Court is likewise precluded. The eleventh amendment and the portion of article III affected by it refer to the judicial power of the United States, and do not distinguish between lower courts and the Supreme Court.1 This argument is, however, implicitly rejected in Nevada v. Hall itself. If the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the state's petition because of limitations on the federal judicial power, it should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, regardless of whether, on the merits, the Constitution required the state to apply immunity. 42 By examining the merits the Court clearly exercised its jurisdiction. Moreover, not to have heard the case because of the eleventh amendment would have produced an anomaly: the very constitutional provisions that ensure the immunity of states in federal courts would preclude the federal enforcement of immunity in state courts.
A better interpretation is that the article III grant of judicial power over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State" was intended to give states a federal court forum, when appropriate, to assert any applicable immunity, whether from state or federal jurisdiction. This approach is consistent with the idea that article III by its terms neither requires nor precludes domestic sovereign immunity.1 43 Indeed, it provides an explanation for the language's presence in article III in the first place. One argument against state immunity in federal courts, accepted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 144 is that the extension of judicial power over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State" could not logically be limited to suits in which the state is a plaintiff. This argument may be refuted by noting that when a state is a defendant, the federal court should have a limited jurisdiction to determine whether the state has an immunity. In effect, this happens when any federal court takes jurisdiction to determine whether there is immunity. There is no reason why the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should not be able to determine whether immunity exists. If the Supreme Court can do so, its authority must come from the jurisdictional grant of article III over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State." The Supreme Court, hearing a case on certiorari from a state court, is accordingly not precluded by article III or the eleventh amendment from determining whether the state is immune from suit. A more difficult problem is that although the Supreme Court may constitutionally decide on an appeal from state court whether the state is immune, Congress has arguably limited that appellate jurisdiction to cases in which the immunity is based on the Constitution. 145 The Judicial Code provides for Supreme Court review of state high court decisions "where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of. . . the United States."' 146 There was little difficulty with the application of this provision in Nevada v. Hall, for Nevada asserted that its immunity was based on the Constitution and was, therefore, an "immunity . . . claimed under the Constitution."' 4 7 If a state argues, however, that a quasi-sovereign state has immunity as a matter of international law, and that nothing in the Constitution or federal law supersedes or removes that immunity, one might argue that the defendant has no "title, right, privilege or immunity. . . specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes" and that Congress has accordingly withdrawn from the Court's appellate jurisdiction cases in which an international law immunity is asserted. This too would be an anomalous result, for the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of all fights and duties superior to state law.
This anomaly does not result, however, because international rights and duties of states among themselves are in one sense constitutional. If one considers the Constitution to be the resolution of the totality of rights and duties of states among themselves, then the application of international law rights and duties by the Supreme Court is a recognition that the Constitution preserves those rights and duties. In that sense interstate sovereign immunity, to the extent it is recognized under international law and not limited by Constitution or statute, is an immunity "claimed under the Constitution." This theory is supported by Supreme Court decisions that refer to the application of international law to interstate disputes as federal common law, 148 and by analogy to admiralty law. Because the judicial power extends to controversies between states, controversies between a state and the citizens of another state, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Court is forced in these contexts to determine law that does not depend on the law of individual states. 149 Because the power to declare the law is derived from the grant of judicial power, 50 the immunity is constitutional. Just as an issue of federal admiralty law would be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,1 5 1 even though the Constitution does not indicate how a particular admiralty issue should be decided, so an issue of intersovereign immunity would be subject to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, despite the absence of a requirement of immunity in the plan or language of the Constitution.
V. THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERSOVERBIGN IMMUNITY
Even if the Supreme Court should have applied principles of international sovereign immunity in Nevada v. Hall as federal common law, it came to the proper judgment. This is so because international sovereign immunity has been greatly limited in the twentieth century. 1 52 The law has changed from absolute to restrictive sovereign immunity' 53 Complete immunity of one nation in the courts of another has given way, generally but not universally, to immunity only when the state acts in a public rather than in a commercial capacity. This development has coincided with the development of extensive governmental undertakings in the areas of industry and commerce, particularly in socialist states.' 5 4
The difficulty with restricting the immunity that had formerly been absolute was in drawing the line between public activities (acta jure imperii) and commercial activities (actajure gestionis).1 55 Nonetheless, the United States State Department announced in 1952 that in the future it would apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 156 Until 1976 the courts generally deferred to State Department decisions about the immunity of a foreign state. 157 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,158 however, gave the courts the task of determining when a foreign state is immune under the Act.' 59 The Act attempts to codify the current American view of international law, that is, the restrictive theory. 60 It is thus the most authoritative source for the Supreme Court to consider in applying international law to determine whether one state is immune in another state's courts.
The Act provides a broad immunity for nations,' 61 subject to several exceptions. 162 The major exception is for actions arising out of a defendant's "commercial activity" having a nexus with the United States. 63 The Act defines "commercial activity,"' 164 and the Act's legislative history includes some examples of commercial activity, but the legislative history concedes that the statutory definition is not "exces- 'commercial activity.'"166 Given the difficulty of making the distinction and the imprecision of the statutory definition, one might argue that the principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act should be limited to those cases to which the Act is expressly addressed-suits against foreign sovereigns. But as the courts will need to interpret the Act for purposes of foreign sovereigns in any case, 167 there is no reason why the same or a similar body of precedents 168 cannot be applied to interstate immunity.
The Act has other specific exceptions to immunity as well. The exceptions include cases in which the foreign state has waived its immunity 69 
1017-89 (1977).
The Court is forced to make distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign functions in other contexts as well. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (holding that federal minimum-wage laws may not be applied to states in ways that interfere with the states' capacity to perform their sovereign functions).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
